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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss referential choice – the process of referential 
device selection made by the speaker in the course of discourse 
production. We aim at explaining the actual referential choices attested 
in the discourse sample. Two alternative models of referential choice are 
discussed. The first approach of Kibrik (1996, 1999, 2000) is the 
cognitive calculative approach. It suggests that referential choice 
depends on the referent’s current activation score in the speaker’s 
                                                 
1 This article results from two papers delivered at DAARC: the talk by Kibrik at DAARC-2000 
in Lancaster, and the joint talk by Grüning and Kibrik at DAARC-2002 in Lisbon. Andrej 
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working memory. The activation score can be calculated as a sum of 
numeric contributions of individual activation factors, such as distance to 
the antecedent, protagonisthood, and the like. Thus a predictive 
dependency between the activation factors and referential choice is 
proposed in this approach. This approach is cognitively motivated and 
allows one to offer generalization about the cognitive system of working 
memory. The calculative approach, however, cannot address non-linear 
interdependencies between different factors. For this reason we 
developed a mathematically more sophisticated neural network 
approach to the same set of data. We trained feed-forward networks on 
the data. They classified up to all but 4 instances correctly with respect 
to the actual referential choice. A pruning procedure allowed to produce 
a minimal network and revealed that out of ten input factors five were 
sufficient to predict the data almost correctly, and that the logical 
structure of the remaining factors can be simplified. This is a pilot study 
necessary for the preparation of a larger neural network-based study.  
 
1.  Introduction 
We approach the phenomena of discourse reference as a realization of the 
process of referential choice: every time the speaker needs to mention a 
referent s/he has a variety of options at his/her disposal, such as full NPs, 
demonstratives, third person pronouns, etc. The speaker chooses one of these 
options according to certain rules that are a part of the language production 
system. Production-oriented accounts of reference are rarer in the literature 
than comprehension-oriented; for some examples see Dale (1992), Strube and 
Wolters (2000). 
Linguistic studies of referential choice often suffer from circularity: for 
example, a pronominal usage is explained by the referent’s high activation, 
while the referent is assumed to be highly activated because it is actually coded 
by a pronoun in discourse. In a series of studies by Kibrik (1996, 1999, 2000) 
an attempt to break such circularity was undertaken. The main methodological 
idea is that we need an account of referent activation that is entirely 
independent of the actual referential choices observed in actual discourse. 
There are a variety of linguistic factors that determine a referent’s current 
activation, and once the level of activation is determined, the referential 
option(s) can be predicted with a high degree of certainty. This approach 
includes a quantitative component that models the interaction of activation 
factors yielding the summary activation of a referent. As will be explained 
below, the contributions of individual factors are simply summed, and for this 
reason we use the shorthand cognitive calculative approach. This approach is 
outlined in section 2 of this paper. 
  
The cognitive calculative approach, however, has some shortcomings; in 
particular, its arithmetic nature could not allow addressing non-linear 
interaction between different factors. It is for this reason that we propose an 
alternative approach based on the mathematical apparatus of neural networks.  
In section 3 computer simulations are reported in which we attempt to find out 
whether neural networks can help us to overcome some shortcomings of 
Kibrik’s original approach. As the available data set is quite small (102 items) 
and large annotated corpora are not so easily obtained, we decided to design 
this study as a pilot study, rather than putting weight on statistical rigor. 
 
2. The cognitive calculative approach 
2.1.  General assumptions underlying the cognitive calculative approach  
In this paper, we approach discourse anaphora from the perspective of a 
broader process that we term referential device selection or, more simply, 
referential choice. This term differs from “discourse anaphora” in the 
following respects. 
1) The notion of “referential choice” emphasizes the dynamic, procedural 
nature of reference in discourse. In addition, it is overtly production oriented: 
referential choice is the process performed by the speaker/writer. In the course 
of each act of referential choice, the speaker chooses a formal device to code 
the referent s/he has in mind. In contrast, “anaphora” is usually understood as a 
more static textual phenomenon, as a relationship between two or more 
segments of text.  
2) Unlike “discourse anaphora”, “referential choice” does not exclude 
introductory mentions of referents and other mentions that are not based on 
already-high activation of the referent. 
3) The notion of referential choice permits one to avoid the dispute on 
whether “anaphora” is restricted to specialized formal devices (such as 
pronouns) or has a purely functional definition. 
These three considerations explain our preference for the notion of 
referential choice. Otherwise the two notions are fairly close in their 
denotation. 
A number of general requirements towards the cognitive calculative 
approach to referential choice were adopted from the outset of the study. The 
model must be:  
(i) speaker-oriented: referential choice is viewed as a part of language 
production performed by the speaker  
(ii) sample-based: the data for the study is a sample of natural discourse, 
rather than heterogeneous examples from different sources 
  
(iii) general: all occurrences of referential devices in sample must be 
accounted for 
(iv) closed: the proposed list of factors cannot be supplemented to account 
for exceptions 
(v) predictive: the proposed list of factors aims at predicting referential 
choice with maximally attainable certainty 
(vi) explanatory and cognitively based: it is claimed that this approach 
models the actual cognitive processes, rather than relies on a black box 
ideology 
(vii) multi-factorial: potential multiplicity of factors determining referential 
choice is recognized; each factor must be monitored in each case, rather 
than in an ad hoc manner, and the issue of interaction between various 
relevant factors must be addressed 
(viii) calculative: contributions of activation factors are numerically 
characterized 
(ix) testable: all components of this approach are subject to verification 
(x) non-circular: factors must be identified independently of the actual 
referential choice. 
 
2.2. The cognitive model 
Now, a set of more specific assumptions on how referential choice works at 
the cognitive level is in order. Recently a number of studies have appeared 
suggesting that referential choice is directly related to the more general 
cognitive domain of working memory and the process of activation in working 
memory (Chafe, 1994; Tomlin and Pu, 1991; Givón, 1995; Cornish, 1999; 
Kibrik, 1991, 1996, 1999). For cognitive psychological and neurophysiological 
accounts of working memory see Baddeley (1986, 1990), Anderson (1990), 
Cowan (1995), Posner and Raichle (1994), Smith and Jonides (1997). The 
claim that referential choice is governed by memorial processes is compatible 
with psycholinguistic frameworks of such authors as Gernsbacher (1990), 
Clifton and Ferreira (1987), Vonk, Hustinx and Simons (1992), with the 
cognitively-oriented approaches of the Topic continuity research (Givón ed., 
1983), Accessibility theory (Ariel, 1990), Centering theory (Gordon, Grosz and 
Gilliom, 1993), Givenness hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski, 1993), 
and Cognitive grammar (van Hoek, 1997), as well as with some computational 
models covered in Botley and McEnery (eds., 2000). Thus the first element of 
the cognitive model can be formulated as follows:  
¾ The primary cognitive determiner of referential choice is activation of the 
referent in question in the speaker’s working memory (henceforth: WM). 
Activation is a matter of degree. Some chunks of information are more 
central in WM while some others are more peripheral. The term activation 
  
score (AS) is used here to refer to the current referent’s level of centrality in 
the working memory. AS can vary within a certain range – from a minimal to a 
maximal value. This range is not continuous in the sense that there are certain 
important thresholds in it. When the referent’s current AS is high, semantically 
reduced referential devices, such as pronouns and zeroes, are used. On the 
other hand, when the AS is low, semantically full devices such as full NPs are 
used. Thus the second basic idea of the cognitive model proposed here is the 
following. 
¾ If AS is above a certain threshold, then a semantically reduced (pronoun or 
zero) reference is possible, and if not, a full NP is used. 
Thus at any given moment in discourse any given referent has a certain AS. 
The claim is that AS depends on a whole gamut of various factors that can 
essentially be grouped in two main classes: 
• properties of the referent (such as the referent’s animacy and centrality) 
• properties of the previous discourse (distance to the antecedent, the 
antecedent’s syntactic and semantic status, paragraph boundaries, etc.) 
 
These factors are specified below in sections 2.3 and 2.4. Now the third 
basic point of the model can be formulated: 
¾ At any given point of discourse all relevant factors interact with each 
other, and give rise to the integral characterization of the given referent 
(AS) with respect to its current position in the speaker’s WM. 
In other words, such oft-cited factors of referential choice as distance to the 
antecedent, referent centrality, etc., affect the referential choice not directly but 
through the mediation of the speaker’s cognitive system, specifically, his/her 
WM. Therefore these factors can be called activation factors.  
The actual cognitive on-line process of referential choice is a bit more 
complex than is suggested by the three postulates formulated above. Some 
work on referential choice (see e.g. Kibrik, 1991) has been devoted to the issue 
of ambiguity of reduced referential devices. In the process of referential choice, 
a normal speaker filters out those referential options that can create ambiguity, 
or referential conflict. Thus it is possible that even in case of high activation of 
a referent a reduced referential device is still ruled out. The referential conflict 
filter is outside of the focus of this paper, but consider one illustrative example 
from the Russian story discussed in the following section, in an English 
translation. 
 (1) The mechanic started, but immediately returned – he began to dig in 
the box of instruments; they were lying in their places, in full order. 
  
He pulled out one wrench, dropped it, shook his head, whispered 
something and reached in again. Fedorchuk now clearly saw that the 
mechanic was a coward and would never go out to the wing. The 
pilot angrily poked the mechanic at the helmet with his fist <…> 
 
The referent of interest here is “the mechanic”; all of its mentions are 
underlined, and the pronominal mentions are also italicized. The point in 
question is the boldfaced mention of this referent. “The mechanic” is very 
highly activated at this point (see section 2.3 below), therefore, the pronominal 
mention him can be expected here. However, in the Russian original text (as 
well as in its English translation) such pronominal mention does not really fit. 
The reason is that, in spite of the extremely high activation of the referent, 
there is also at least one other referent, “Fedorchuk”, that is equally activated 
and therefore can be assumed by the addressee to be the referent of the 
pronoun. Using a pronoun to refer to “the mechanic” would cause a referential 
conflict. Normally speakers/writers filter out the instances of potential 
referential conflict, by using disambiguation devices – from gender-specific 
pronouns to full NPs, as in example (1). (For details see Kibrik 1991, 2001.)  
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Both of the presented studies are based on small datasets, especially by 
standards of modern computational and corpus linguistics. However, it must be 
made clear that the original purport of these studies was of theoretical, rather 
than computational, character: to overcome two major stumbling blocks 
common for the studies of reference. To reiterate, these two stumbling blocks 
are: 
• circularity: Referential choice is explained by the level of activation (or 
another quasi-synonymous status), and the judgment on the level of 
activation is obtained from the actual referential form employed 
• multiplicity of factors: Suppose factor A is of central importance in 
instance X, and factor B in instance Y. It often remains unclear what, if any, 
is the role of factor A in instance Y, and of factor B in instance X. 
 
So, the goal of the proposed approach is to explore the following issue: is it 
possible to construct a system of activation factors that, first,  are determined 
independently of actual referential choice, and, second, predict and explain 
referential choice in a cognitively plausible way? 
As will become clear from the exposition of the calculative component of 
this approach, it is extremely time- and effort-consuming, and inherently must 
have been restricted to a small dataset. We believe this does not call into 
question the theoretical result: a system of interacting activation factors can 
indeed be constructed. 
 
2.3. The Russian study 
In this study (for details see Kibrik, 1996) a single sample of narrative prose 
was investigated – a short story by the Russian writer Boris Zhitkov “Nad 
vodoj” (“Over the water”). This particular sample discourse was selected for 
this study because narrative prose is one of the most basic discourse types2, 
                                                 
2 There is an unresolved debate in reference studies on whether referential processes are genre-
dependent. Fox (1987a) proposed two different systems of referential choice, depending on 
discourse type. Toole (1996) has argued that the factors of referential choice are genre-
independent. We do not address this issue in this article, but assume that in any case referential 
choice in narrative discourse must be close to the very nuclear patterns of reference, since 
narration is among the basic functions of language, is attested universally in all languages and 
cultures, and provides a very favorable environment for recurrent mention of referents in 
successive discourse units. 
  
because written prose is a well-controlled mode in the sense that previous 
discourse is the only source for the recurring referents, and because Boris 
Zhitkov is an excellent master of style, with a very simple and clear language, 
well-motivated lexical choices, and at the same time with a neutral, non-exotic 
way of writing. This specific story is a prototypical narrative describing 
primarily basic events – physical events, interactions of people, people’s 
reflections, sentiments, and speech. The story is written in the third person, so 
there are no numerous references to the narrator. 
The sample discourse comprised about 300 discourse units (roughly, 
clauses). There are about 500 mentions of various referents in the sample, and 
there are some 70 different referents appearing in the discourse. However, only 
a minority of them occurs more than once. There are 25 referents appearing at 
least once in an anaphoric context, that is in a situation where at least a certain 
degree of activation can be expected. 
The fundamental opposition in Russian referential choice is between full 
NPs and the third person pronoun on. Discourse-conditioned referential zeroes 
are also important, but they are rarer than on (for further details see Kibrik, 
1996).  
Several textual factors have been suggested in the literature as directly 
determining the choice of referential device. Best known is the suggestion by 
Givón (1983; 1990) that linear distance from an anaphor to the antecedent is at 
least one of the major predictors of referential choice. Givón measured linear 
distance in terms of clauses, and that principle turned out to be very productive 
and viable. In many later studies, including this one, discourse microstructure 
is viewed as a network of discourse units essentially coinciding with clauses. 
(There are certain reservations regarding this coincidence, but they are 
irrelevant for this paper.) 
Fox (1987a: Ch. 5) argued that it is the rhetorical, hierarchical structure of 
discourse rather than plain linear structure that affects selection of referential 
devices. Fox counted rhetorical distance to the antecedent on the basis of a 
rhetorical structure constructed for a text in accordance with the Rhetorical 
Structure Theory (RST), as developed by Mann and Thompson (see Mann, 
Matthiessen, and Thompson, 1992). According to RST, each discourse unit 
(normally a clause) is connected to at least one other discourse unit by means 
of a rhetorical relation, and via it, ultimately, to any other discourse unit. There 
exists a limited (although extensible) inventory of rhetorical relations, such as 
joint, sequence, cause, elaboration, etc. In terms of RST, each text can be 
represented as a tree graph consisting of nodes (discourse units) and 
connections (rhetorical relations). Rhetorical distance between nodes A and B 
is then the number of horizontal steps one needs to make to reach A from B 
  
along the graph. (One example of a rhetorical graph is shown below in section 
2.4.) Fox was correct in suggesting that rhetorical distance measurement is a 
much more powerful tool for modeling reference than linear distance. 
However, linear distance also plays its role, though a more modest one. 
In a number of works it was suggested that a crucial factor of referential 
choice is episodic structure, especially in narratives. Marslen-Wilson, Levy and 
Tyler (1982), Tomlin (1987), and Fox (1987b) have all demonstrated, though 
using very different methodologies, that an episode/paragraph boundary is a 
borderline after which speakers tend to use full NPs even if the referent was 
recently mentioned. Thus one can posit the third type of distance measurement 
– paragraph distance, measured as the number of paragraph boundaries 
between the point in question and the antecedent. 
One more factor was emphasized in Grimes (1978) – the centrality of a 
referent in discourse, which we call protagonisthood below. For a discussion of 
how to measure a referent’s centrality see Givón (1990: 907-909). 
Several other factors have been suggested in the literature, including 
animacy, syntactic and semantic roles played by the NP/referent and by the 
antecedent, distance to the antecedent measured in full sentences, and the 
referential status of the antecedent (full/reduced NP). Some of these factors 
will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.4 below, in connection with the 
English data. 
From the maximal list of potentially significant activation factors we picked 
a subset of those that prove actually significant for Russian narrative prose. 
The criterion used is as follows. Each factor can be realized in a number of 
values, for example a distance factor may have values 1, 2, etc. Each 
potentially significant factor has a “privileged” value that presumably 
correlates with the more reduced form of reference. For example, for the linear 
distance to the antecedent it is the value of “1”, while for the factor of the 
antecedent’s syntactic role it is “subject”. Only those potential factors whose 
privileged value demonstrated a high co-occurrence (in at least 2/3 of all cases) 
with the reduced form of reference have been considered significant activation 
factors.  For example, the factor of rhetorical distance patterns vis-à-vis 
pronouns and full NPs in a nearly mirror image way: there is a high co-
occurrence of the value of 1 with pronominal reference (91%), and a high co-
occurrence of rhetorical distance greater than 1 (79%) with full NP reference.  
On the other hand, other potential factors did not display any significant co-
occurrence with referential choice. In particular, the parameter of referential 
type of the antecedent does not correlate at all with the referent’s current 
pronominalizability: for instance, a 3rd person pronoun is the antecedent of 
  
10% of all 3rd person pronouns and 13% of full NPs which makes no 
significance difference.  
Seven significant activation factors have been detected. Here is their list 
with the indication [in brackets] of the privileged value co-occurring with 
pronominal reference: animacy [human], protagonisthood [yes], linear distance 
[1], rhetorical distance [1], paragraph distance [0], syntactic [subject] and 
semantic [Actor3] roles of the antecedent, and sloppy identity4. 
After the set of significant activation factors had been identified, certain 
numeric weights have been assigned to their values. Variation of referents' AS 
from 0 to 1 was postulated. The activation factor weights take discrete values 
measured in steps of size 0.1. In each particular case all weights of all involved 
factors can be summed and the resulting activation score is supposed to predict 
referential choice. 
Table 1 below lists a selection of activation factors, each factor with the 
values it can accept and the corresponding numeric weights.  
                                                 
3 The term “Actor” is an abstract semantic macrorole; it designates the semantically central 
participant of a clause, with more-than-one-place verbs usually agent or experiencer; see e.g. 
Van Valin (1993:43ff). 
4 The factor of sloppy identity occurs when two expressions are referentially close, but not 
identical. In the following example from the story under investigation, given in a nearly literal 
English translation, the first expression is referentially specific, and the second (it) generic: 
(i) He understood that the engine skipped, that probably the carburetor had gotten clogged 
(through it gas gets into an engine) <…>  
Sloppy identity is relevant in far fewer cases than other factors, and for this reason it can be 
called a second-order, or “weak”, factor. Sloppy identity slightly reduces activation of a referent 
that has an antecedent, but a sloppy one. 
  
Activation factor Value Numeric activation weight 
 
Rhetorical distance  
to the antecedent 
1 
2 
3 
4+ 
 
0.7 
0.4 
0 
–0.3 
 
Paragraph distance  
to the antecedent 
0 
1 
2+ 
 
0 
–0.2 
–0.4 
 
Protagonisthood 
Yes, and the current mention is:
      the 1st mention in a series 
      the 2nd mention in a series 
      otherwise 
No 
 
0.3 
0.1 
0 
0 
 
Table 1: Examples of activation factors, their values, and numeric weights 
 
Аctivation factors  differ regarding their logical structure. Some factors are 
sources of activation. The strongest among these is the factor of rhetorical 
distance to the antecedent. The closer the rhetorical antecedent is, the higher is 
the activation.  
The factor of paragraph distance is never a source of activation; vice versa, 
it is, so to speak, a penalizing factor. In the default situation, when the 
antecedent is in the same paragraph (paragraph distance = 0), this factor does 
not contribute to AS at all. When the antecedent is separated from the current 
point in discourse by one or more paragraph boundaries, the activation is 
lowered. 
The third factor illustrated in Table 1, that of protagonisthood, has a still 
different logical structure. It can be called a compensating factor. It can only 
add activation, but does that in very special situations. When a referent is not a 
protagonist, this factor does not affect activation. If a referent is a protagonist, 
this factor helps to regain activation at the beginning of a series5, that is, in the 
situation of lowered activation. If the activation is high anyway, this factor 
does not matter. 
The numeric weights such as those in Table 1 were obtained through a 
heuristic procedure of trials and errors. After several dozen of successive 
adjusting trials the numeric system turned out to predict a subset of referential 
choices correctly: reduced referential forms were getting ASs close to 1, and 
                                                 
5 The notion of “series” means a sequence of consecutive discourse units, such that: (i) all of 
them mention the referent in question, and (ii) the sequence is preceded by at least three 
consecutive discourse units not mentioning the referent.  
  
full NPs were getting ASs much closer to 0. When this was finally achieved, it 
turned out that all other occurrences of referential devices are properly 
predicted by this set of numeric weights without any further adjustment.  It is 
worth pointing out that such trial-and-error procedure, performed by hand, is 
extremely time- and labor-consuming, even provided that the dataset was 
relatively small. The difference of this approach from the prior approaches is 
that the full control of the dataset, whatever size it has, has been gained. 
After the calculative model was completely adjusted to the data of the 
Zhitkov’s story, it was tested on a different narrative – a fragment of Fazil’ 
Iskander’s story “Stalin and Vuchetich”, about 100 discourse units long. The 
result was that the model predicted all referential choices in the test dataset, 
without further adjustment (with the exception of minor adjustment in the 
numerical weights of two activation factors). These facts can be taken as 
evidence suggesting that the developed system does model actual referential 
choice in written narratives closely enough.  
One more crucial point needs to be made about this model. When one 
observes actual referential choices in actual discourse, one can only see the 
ready results of referential device selection by the author – full NPs, pronouns, 
or zeroes. However, the real variety of devices is somewhat greater. It is 
important to distinguish between the categorical and potentially alternating 
referential choices. For example, the pronoun on in a certain context may be 
the only available option, while in another context it could well be replaced by 
an equally good referential option, say a full NP. These are two different 
classes of situations, and they correspond to two different levels of referent 
activation. The referential strategies formulated in Kibrik (1996) for Russian 
narrative discourse are based on this observation. Those referential strategies 
shown in Table 2 below represent the mapping of different AS levels onto 
possible referential choices. 
 
Referential 
device: 
Full NP only Full NP most likely,  
pronoun /zero unlikely 
Either full NP 
or pronoun/zero 
Pronoun/zero 
only 
AS: 0–0.3 0.4–0.6 0.7–0.9 1 
 
Table 2: Referential strategies in Russian narrative discourse 
 
What governs the speaker’s referential choice when the AS is within the 
interval of the activation scale that allows variable referential devices 
(especially 0.7 through 0.9)? We do not have a definitive answer to this 
question at this time. The choice may depend on idiolect, on discourse type and 
genre, or perhaps even be random. On the other hand, there may be some 
additional, extra-weak, factors that come into play in such situations. 
  
 2.4. The English study 
The model developed for Russian narrative discourse was subsequently 
applied to a sample of English narrative discourse, which required a fair 
amount of modification. This study was described in Kibrik (1999), and here 
its main results are reported, along with some additional details. The sample (or 
small corpus) was the children’s story “The Maggie B.” by Irene Haas. There 
are 117 discourse units in it. 76 different referents are mentioned in it, not 
counting 13 more mentioned in the quoted songs. There are 225 referent 
mentions in the discourse (not counting those in quoted text). There are 14 
different referents mentioned in discourse that are important for this study. 
They are those mentioned at least once in a context where any degree of 
activation can be possibly expected. Among the important referents, there are 
three protagonist referents: “Margaret” (72 mentions altogether), “James” (28 
mentions), and “the ship” (12 mentions). An excerpt from the sample 
discourse, namely lines 1401–2104, is given in the Appendix below. 
Any referent, including an important referent, can be mentioned in different 
ways, some of which (for example, first person pronouns in quoted speech) are 
irrelevant for this study. Those that are relevant for this study fall into two 
large formal classes: references by full NPs and references by activation-based 
pronouns. “Activation-based pronouns” means the unmarked, general type of 
pronoun occurrences that cannot be accounted for by means of any kind of 
syntactic rules, in particular, for the simple reason that they often appear in a 
different sentence than their antecedents. In order to explain and predict this 
kind of pronoun occurrence, it is necessary to construct a system of the type 
described in section 2.3, taking into account a variety of factors related to 
discourse context and referents’ properties. Typical examples of activation-
based pronouns are given in (2) below6.  
 (2) 1607 Lightning split the sky 
   1608 as she ran into the cabin 
   1609 and slammed the door against the wet wind. 
   1610 Now everything was safe and secure. 
   1701 When she lit the lamps, 
   1702 the cabin was bright and warm. 
 
There are two occurrences of the activation-based pronoun she in (2), and 
the second one is even used across the paragraph boundary from its antecedent. 
                                                 
6 In the examples, as well as in Appendix 1, each line represents one discourse unit. In line 
numbers the first two digits refer to the paragraph number in the story, and the last two digits to 
the number of the discourse unit within the current paragraph. 
  
Besides the activation-based 3rd person pronouns, there are a couple dozen 
occurrences of syntactic pronouns that can potentially be accounted for in 
terms of simpler syntactic rules. At the same time, the activation-based 
principles outlined here can easily account for syntactic pronouns, see Kibrik 
(1999)7. 
Thus the focus of this study was restricted to 39 full NP references and 40 
activation-based pronominal references. As was pointed out in section 2.3 
above, within each of the referential types – full NPs and pronouns – there is a 
crucial difference: whether the referential form in question has an alternative. 
In (3) below an illustration of a pronoun usage is given that can vary with a full 
NP: in unit 1601 the full NP Margaret could well be used (especially provided 
that there is a paragraph boundary in front of unit 1601). 
 (3) 1502 A storm was coming! 
  1503 Margaret must make the boat ready at once. 
  1601 She took in the sail 
  1602 and tied it tight. 
 
Contrariwise, there are instances of categorical pronouns. Consider (4), 
which is a direct continuation of (3): 
 (4) 1603 She dropped the anchor 
  1604 and stowed all the gear <...> 
 
In 1603, it would be impossible to use the full NP Margaret; only a pronoun 
is appropriate. 
                                                 
7 For an example of a syntactic pronoun cf. one sentence from the story under investigation (see 
Appendix, lines 1601-1602): 
(ii) She took in the sail and tied it tight. 
Pronouns occurrences such as it in this example can be accounted for by means of syntactic 
rules that are lighter, in some sense, than the activation-based procedure of referential choice 
described here. For an example of a generalized treatment of activation-based and syntactic 
referential devices see section 3 of this article. 
  
For the English data, it was found that referential forms of each type (for 
example, pronouns) fall into three categories: those allowing no alternative 
(= categorical), those allowing a questionable alternative, and those allowing a 
clear alternative. Thus there are six possible correspondences between the five 
potential types and two actual realizations; see Table 3. 
 
Potential  
referential form 
Full NP only Full NP, 
?pronoun 
Full NP or 
pronoun 
Pronoun, 
?full NP 
Pronoun only 
Frequency 15 17 7 15 18 7 
 
Actual  
referential form 
 
 
Full NP (39) 
 
 
Pronoun (40) 
 
Table 3: Actual and potential referential forms,  
and their frequencies in sample discourse 
 
The information about referential alternatives is crucial for establishing 
referential strategies. Of course, attribution of particular cases to one of the 
categories is not straightforward. It must be noted that such attribution is the 
second extremely laborious procedure involved in this kind of study (along 
with the search for optimal numerical weights of activation factors). To do this 
attribution properly, a significant number of native speakers must be consulted. 
There were two sources of information on referential alternatives used in this 
study: (i) an expert who was a linguist and a native speaker of English and had 
a full understanding of the problem and the research method, and who supplied 
her intuitive judgments on all thinkable referential alternatives in all relevant 
points of discourse; (ii) a group of 12 students, native speakers of English, who 
judged the felicity of a wide variety of modifications of the original referential 
choices through a complicated experimental procedure.  These two kinds of 
data were brought together and gave rise to an integral judgment for each 
referential alternative. The details of this part of the study are reported in 
Kibrik (1999). At the end all referential alternatives were classified as either 
appropriate, questionable, or inappropriate – see Table 4 below. The attribution 
of referential alternatives to categories is an indispensable component of this 
study, since the two formal categories “pronoun” vs. “full NP” are far too 
rough to account for the actual fluidity of referential choice. 
The six strongest activation factors that were found to be most important in 
modeling the data of the sample discourse are the following: rhetorical distance 
to the antecedent (RhD), linear distance to the antecedent (LinD), paragraph 
  
distance to the antecedent (ParaD), syntactic role of the linear antecedent8, 
animacy, and protagonisthood. The first three of these factors are different 
measurements of the distance from the point in question to the antecedent. By 
far the most influential among the distance factors, and in fact among all 
activation factors, is the factor of rhetorical distance: it can add up to 0.7 to the 
activation score of a referent. Linear and paragraph distances can only 
penalize a referent for activation; this happens if the distance to the antecedent 
is too high. To see how rhetorical (hierarchical) structure of discourse can be 
distinct from its linear structure, consider the rhetorical graph in Figure 29.  
 
     1801-2104
     sequence 
1801-1904           2001-2004  2101-2104
 background          sequence  sequence 
 1801-1803 1901-1904  2001-2003 2004 2101
 2102 2103-2104
 sequence  nevertheless   joint           
joint 
1801 1802 1803 1901-1902 1903-1904 2001 2002-2003 
 2103      2104
          joint       result   elaboration 
   1901 1902 1903 1904  2002  2003
 
Figure 2: A rhetorical graph corresponding to lines 1801–2104 of the excerpt  
given in the Appendix 
 
Rhetorical distance is counted as the number of horizontal steps required in 
order to reach the antecedent’s discourse unit from the current discourse unit. 
For a simple example, consider the pronoun him in discourse unit 1802. It has 
its antecedent James in discourse unit 1801. There is one horizontal step from 
1802 to the left to 1801, hence RhD = 1. The pronoun they in 2004 has its 
antecedent Margaret and James in 2001. In order to reach 2001 from 2004 one 
needs to make two horizontal steps along the tree leftwards: 2004 to 2002 and 
                                                 
8 Note that one referent mention often has two distinct closest antecedents: a rhetorical and a 
linear one. 
9 It is a commonplace in the research on Rhetorical Structure Theory that there is certain 
constrained variation in how a given text can be represented as a hierarchical graph by different 
annotators (see Mann, Matthiessen, and Thompson 1992, Carlson, Marcu, and Okurowski 
2003). To be sure, the fact of variation is the inherent property of discourse interpretation, and 
there is no other way of getting “better” hierarchical trees than rely on judgment of trained 
experts.  
  
2002 to 2001. To visualize this more clearly, it is useful to collapse the 
fragment of the tree onto one linear dimension, see Figure 3.  Thus RhD = 2. 
 
 
2001 2002  2003  2004 
 
Figure 3. One-dimensional representation of a fragment of the rhetorical graph. 
 
In narratives, the fundamental rhetorical relation is that of sequence. Three 
paragraphs of the four depicted in Figure 2 (#18, #20, and #21) are connected 
by this relation, and within each of these paragraphs there are sequenced 
discourse units, too. If there were no other rhetorical relations in narrative 
besides sequence, rhetorical distance would always equal linear distance. 
However, this is not the case. In the example analyzed, one paragraph, namely 
#19, is off the main narrative line. It provides the background scene against 
which the mainline events take place. Likewise, discourse unit 1904 reports a 
result of what is reported in 1903. The difference between the linear and the 
rhetorical distance can best be shown by the example of discourse unit 2001. 
For the referents “Margaret” and “James”, mentioned therein, the nearest 
antecedents are found in discourse unit 1802. It is easy to see that the linear 
distance from 2001 to 1802 is 6 (which is a very high distance) while the 
rhetorical distance is just 2 (first step: from 2001 to 1803, second step from 
1803 to 1802). Perhaps the most conclusive examples of the power of 
rhetorical distance as a factor in referential choice are the cases of long 
quotations: it is often the case that in a clause following a long quotation one 
can use a pronoun, with the nearest antecedent occurring before the quotation. 
This is possible in spite of the very high linear distance, and due to the short 
rhetorical distance: the pronoun’s clause and the antecedent’s clause in such 
case can be directly connected in the rhetorical structure. 
The following factor, indicated above, and the second most powerful source 
of activation, is the factor of syntactic role of the linear antecedent. This factor 
applies only when the linear distance is short enough: after about four 
discourse units it gets forgotten what the role of the antecedent was; only the 
fact of its presence may still be relevant. Also, this factor has a fairly diverse 
set of values. As has long been known from studies of syntactic anaphora, 
subject is the best candidate for the pronoun’s antecedent. (This observation is 
akin to the ranking of “forward-looking centers” in Centering theory, 
suggesting that the subject of the current utterance is the likeliest among other 
participants to recur in the next utterance with a privileged status; see e.g. 
Walker and Prince 1996: 297.) Different subtypes of subjects, though, make 
different contributions to referent activation, ranging from 0.4 to 0.2. Other 
  
relevant values of the factor include the direct object, the indirect (most 
frequently, agentive) object, the possessor, and the nominal part of the 
predicate. It is very typical of pronouns, especially for categorical pronouns 
(allowing no full NP alternative) to have subjects as their antecedents. For 
example, consider three pronouns in paragraph #16 (see Appendix): she 
(discourse unit 1603), her (1606), and she (1608). According to the results of 
the experimental study mentioned above, the first and the second pronouns are 
categorical (that is, Margaret could not be used instead) and they have subject 
antecedents. But the third one has a non-subject antecedent, and it immediately 
becomes a potentially alternating pronoun (Margaret would be perfectly 
appropriate here)10.  
The following two factors are related not to the previous discourse but to the 
relatively stable properties of the referent in question. Animacy specifies the 
permanent characterization of the referent on the scale “human – animal – 
inanimate”. Protagonisthood specifies whether the referent is the main 
character of the discourse. Protagonisthood and animacy are rate-of-
deactivation compensating factors (see discussion in section 2.3). They capture 
the observation that important discourse referents and human referents 
deactivate slower than those referents that are neither important nor human. In 
addition, a group of second-order, or “weak”, factors were identified, including 
the following ones. Supercontiguity comes into play when the antecedent and 
the discourse point in question are in some way extraordinarily close (e.g. 
being contiguous words or being in one clause). Temporal or spatial shift is 
similar to paragraph boundary but is a weaker episodic boundary; for example, 
occurrence of the clause-initial then frequently implies that the moments of 
time reported in two consecutive clauses are distinct, in some way separated 
from each other rather than flowing one from the other. Weak referents are 
those that are not likely to be maintained, they are mentioned only 
occasionally. Such referents often appear without articles (cf. NPs rain, 
cinnamon and honey, supper in the text excerpt given in the Appendix) or are 
parts of stable collocations designating stereotypical activities (slam the door, 
light the lamps, give a bath). Finally, introductory antecedent means that when 
a referent is first introduced into discourse it takes no less than two mentions to 
fully activate it. 
For details on the specific values of all activation factors, and the 
corresponding numeric weights, refer to Kibrik (1999). As in case of the 
Russian study, the numeric activation weights of each value were obtained 
through a long heuristic trial-and-error procedure. All referential facts 
                                                 
10 This demonstration of one factor operating in isolation is not intended to be conclusive, since 
the essence of the present approach is the idea that all factors operate in conjunction. It does, 
however, serve to illustrate the point. 
  
contained in the original discourse and obtained through experimentation with 
alternative forms of reference, are indeed predicted/explained by the 
combination of activation factors with their numeric weights, and the 
referential strategies. 
The referential strategies formulated in this study are represented in Table 4. 
As in section 2.3, the referential strategies indicate the mappings of different 
intervals on the AS scale onto possible referential devices. 
 
Referential 
device: 
Full NP only Full NP, 
?pronoun 
Either full NP  
or pronoun 
Pronoun, ?full 
NP 
Pronoun 
only 
AS: 0–0.2 0.3–0.5 0.6–0.7 0.8–1.0 1.1+ 
 
Table 4: Referential strategies in English narrative discourse 
 
The quantitative system in this study was designed so that AS can 
sometimes exceed 1 and reach the value of 1.1 or even 1.2. This is interpreted 
as “extremely high activation” (it gives the speaker no full NP option to 
mention the referent, see the value in the rightmost column of Table 4 and 
below). The AS of 1 is then interpreted as “normal maximal” activation. Also, 
a low AS frequently turns out to be negative. Such values are simply rounded 
to 0. 
According to the referential strategies represented in Table 4, the five 
categories of potential referential forms correspond to five different intervals 
on the activation scale. There are four thresholds on this scale. The thresholds 
of 0.2 and 1.0 are hard: when the AS is 0.2 or less a pronoun cannot be used, 
and when it is over 1.0 a full NP cannot be used. There are also two soft 
thresholds: when the AS is 0.5 or less a pronoun is unlikely, and when it is over 
0.7 a full NP is unlikely. 
To demonstrate how predictively the calculative system of activation factors 
works, several examples of actual calculations are presented below. All 
examples are taken from the text excerpt given in the Appendix. Examples are 
different in that they pertain to different referential options possible on the AS 
scale (see Table 4 above). There is one example for each of the following 
referential options: (a) full NP, ?pronoun; (b) either full NP or pronoun; (c) 
pronoun, ?full NP; (d) pronoun only. The calculations are summarized in Table 
5. 
 
  
Referential option (a) Full NP, 
?pronoun 
(b) Full NP        
or pronoun 
(c) Pronoun, 
?full NP 
(d) Pronoun 
only 
Line number 1802 1701 1802 1603 
Referential form Margaret She him she
Referent “Margaret” “Margaret” “James” “Margaret” 
Actual referential device full NP pronoun pronoun pronoun 
Alternative referential device ?pronoun full NP ?full NP — 
Corresponding AS interval 0.3–0.5 0.6–0.7 0.8–1.0 1+ 
Relevant activation factors 
      RhD        VALUE: 
   NUM. WEIGHT: 
      LinD        VALUE: 
   NUM. WEIGHT: 
      ParaD       VALUE: 
   NUM. WEIGHT: 
      Lin. antec.        VALUE: 
  role NUM. WEIGHT: 
      Animacy       VALUE: 
   NUM. WEIGHT: 
      Protagonisthood   VALUE: 
 
   NUM. WEIGHT: 
 
3 
 0
3 
 –0.2
1 
 –0.3
S 
  0.4
Human, LinD≥3 
 0.2
Yes,  
RhD+ParaD≥3 
 0.2
 
2 
 0.5
2 
 –0.1
1 
 –0.3
S 
 0.4
Human, LinD≤2 
 0
Yes,  
RhD+ParaD≥3 
 0.2
 
1 
 0.7 
1 
 0 
0 
 0 
passive S 
 0.2 
Human, LinD≤2 
 0 
Yes,  
RhD+ParaD≤2 
 0 
 
1 
 0.7 
1 
 0 
0 
 0 
S 
 0.4 
Human, LinD≤2 
 0 
Yes, 
RhD+ParaD≤2 
 0 
Calculated AS 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.1 
Fit within the predicted  
AS interval 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 5: Examples of calculations of the referents’ ASs in comparison with the 
predictions of the referential strategies (for explanation of factors’ values see Kibrik 1999) 
 
 
The upper portion of Table 5 contains a characterization of each example: 
its location in the text, the actual referential form used by the author, the 
referent, the type of referential device and possible alternative devices, as 
obtained through the experimental study described above. Also, the AS interval 
corresponding to the referential option in question is indicated, in accordance 
with the referential strategies given in Table 4 above. The lower middle portion 
of Table 5 demonstrates the full procedure of calculating the ASs, in 
accordance with the values’ numeric weights. The last line of Table 5 indicates 
whether the calculated AS fits within the range predicted by the referential 
strategies. 
  
2.5. Consequences for working memory 
The studies outlined in sections 2.3 and 2.4 rely on work in cognitive 
psychology, but they are still purely linguistic studies aiming at explanation of 
  
phenomena observed in natural discourse. However, it turns out that the results 
of those studies are significant for a broader field of cognitive science, 
specifically for research in working memory. 
Working memory (WM; otherwise called short-term memory or primary 
memory) is a small and quickly updated storage of information. The study of 
WM is one of the most active fields in modern cognitive psychology (for 
reviews see Baddeley, 1986; Anderson, 1990: ch. 6; some more recent 
approaches are represented in Gathercole (ed.), 1996; Miyake and Shah (eds.), 
1999; Schroeger, Mecklinger, and Friederici (eds.), 2000). WM is also 
becoming an important issue in neuroscience: see Smith and Jonides (1997). 
There are a number of classical issues in the study of WM. Shah and Miyake 
(1999) list eight of major theoretical questions in WM. It appears that the 
results obtained in this linguistic study contribute or at least relate to the 
majority of these hot questions, including: 
• capacity: how much information can there be in WM at one time? 
• forgetting: what is the mechanism through which information quits WM? 
• control: what is the mechanism through which information enters WM? 
• relatedness to attention: how do WM and attention interact? 
• relatedness to general cognition: how does WM participate in complex 
cognitive activities, such as language? 
• (non-)unitariness: is WM a unitary mechanism or a complex of multiple 
subsystems? 
 
Here only some results related to the issues of capacity and attentional 
control will be mentioned. For more detail refer to Kibrik (1999). 
The system of activation factors and their numeric weights was developed 
in order to explain the observed and potential types of referent mentions in 
discourse. In the first place, only those referents that were actually mentioned 
in a given discourse unit were considered. But this system was discovered to 
have an additional advantage: it operates independently of whether a particular 
referent is actually mentioned at the present point in discourse. That is, the 
system can identify any referent’s activation at any point in discourse no matter 
whether the author chose to mention it in that unit or not. If so, one can 
calculate the activation of all referents at a given point in discourse. Consider 
discourse unit 1608 (see Appendix). Only two referents are mentioned there: 
  
“Margaret” and “the cabin”. However, the following other referents have AS 
greater than 0 at this point: “the anchor”, “the gear”, “rain”, “the deck”, 
“thunder”, “lightning”, and “the sky”. The sum of ASs of all relevant referents 
gives rise to grand activation – the summed activation of all referents at the 
given point in discourse. Grand activation gives us an estimate of the capacity 
of the specific-referents portion of WM.  
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Figure 4: The dynamics of two protagonist referents’ activation and of grand activation 
in an excerpt of English narrative (given in the Appendix) 
 
Figure 4 depicts the dynamics of activation processes in a portion of the 
English discourse (lines 1401 through 2104, see Appendix). There are three 
curves in Figure 4: two pertaining to the activation of the protagonists 
“Margaret” and “James”, and the third representing the changes in grand 
activation. Observations of the data in Figure 4 make it possible to arrive at 
several important generalizations. Grand activation varies normally within the 
range between 1 and 3, only rarely going beyond this range and not exceeding 
4. Thus the variation of grand activation is very moderate: maximally, it 
exceeds the maximal activation of an individual referent only about three to 
four times. This gives us an estimate of the maximal capacity of the portion of 
WM related to specific referents in discourse: three or four fully activated 
referents. Interestingly, this estimate coincides with the results recently 
obtained in totally independent psychological research looking at working 
memories specialized for specific kinds of information (Velichkovsky, Challis, 
and Pomplun, 1995; Cowan, 2000). Furthermore, there are strong shifts of 
grand activation at paragraph boundaries; even a visual examination of the 
graph in Figure 4 demonstrates that grand activation values at the beginnings 
of all paragraphs are local minima; almost all of them are below 2. On the other 
hand, in the middle or at the end of paragraphs grand activation usually has 
local maxima. Apparently one of the cognitive functions of a paragraph is a 
threshold of activation update. 
  
The question of control of WM is the question of how information comes 
into WM. The current cognitive literature connects attention and WM (see e.g. 
Miyake and Shah eds., 1999). The issue of this connection is still debated, but 
the following claim seems compatible with most approaches:  
¾ the mechanism controlling WM is what has long been known as attention 
This claim is compatible with the already classical approaches of Baddeley 
(1990) and Cowan (1995), with the neurologically oriented research of Posner 
and Raichle (1994), and cutting-edge studies such as McElree, 2001. 
According to Posner and Raichle (1994: 173), information flows from 
executive attention, based in the brain area known as anterior cingulate, into 
WM, based in the lateral frontal areas of the brain. 
At the same time, as has been convincingly demonstrated in the 
experimental study by Tomlin (1995), attention has a linguistic manifestation, 
namely grammatical roles. In many languages, including English, focally 
attended referents are consistently coded by speakers as the subjects of their 
clauses. As has been demonstrated in the present paper, subjecthood and 
reduced forms of reference are causally related: antecedent subjecthood is 
among the most powerful factors leading to the selection of a reduced form of 
reference. In both English and Russian, antecedent subjecthood can add up to 
0.4 to the overall activation of a referent. In both English and Russian sample 
discourses, 86% of pronouns allowing no referential alternative have subjects 
as their antecedent. 
Considered together, these facts from cognitive psychology and linguistics 
lead one to a remarkably coherent picture of the interplay between attention 
and WM, both at the linguistic and at the cognitive level. Attention feeds WM, 
i.e. what is attended at moment tn becomes activated in WM at moment tn+1. 
Linguistic moments are discourse units. Focally attended referents are typically 
coded by subjects; at the next moment they become activated (even if they 
were not before) and are coded by reduced NPs. The relationships between 
attention and WM, and between their linguistic manifestations, are represented 
in Table 611. 
 
                                                 
11 As has been suggested by an anonymous reviewer, this account may resemble the claims of 
the Centering theory on dynamics of forward- and backward-looking centers. However, we 
would point out that the concept of “backward-looking center” is quite different from our idea 
of referent activation in the subsequent discourse unit. Centering theorists posit a single 
backward-looking center and claim that it is the referent that discourse unit is about (see e.g. 
Walker and Prince, 1996: 294-5). Therefore, backward-looking center must be more like topic 
or attention focus rather than activated referent. We don’t know how such concept of 
backward-looking center could be incorporated in the cognitively inspired model of attention-
memory interplay we propose. 
  
Moments of time 
(discourse units) 
t n tn+1
Cognitive phenomenon focal attention high activation 
Linguistic reflection mention in the subject position reduced NP reference 
Examples Margaret, she she, her 
 
Table 6: Attention and working memory in cognition and in discourse 
 
2.6. Conclusions about the cognitive calculative approach 
The approach outlined above aims at predicting and explaining all 
referential occurrences in the sample discourse. This is done through a rigorous 
calculative methodology aiming at maximally possible predictive power. For 
each referent at any point in discourse, the numeric weights of all involved 
activation factors are available. On the basis of these weights, the integral 
current AS of the referent can be calculated, and mapped onto an appropriate 
referential device in accordance with referential strategies. The objective 
fluidity of the process of referential choice is addressed through the distinction 
between the categorical and potentially alternating referential devices. This 
approach allows to overcome the traditional stumbling blocks of the studies of 
reference: circularity and multiplicity of involved factors. The linguistic study 
of referential choice in discourse was based on cognitive-psychological 
research, and it proved, in turn, relevant for the study of cognitive phenomena 
in a more general perspective.  
 
3. The neural network approach 
3.1. Shortcomings of the calculative approach 
There are some problems with the cognitive calculative approach, especially 
with its calculative, or quantitative, component that was mathematically quite 
unversed. 
First, the list of relevant activation factors may not be exactly necessary and 
sufficient. Those factors were included in the list that showed a strong 
correlation with referential choice. However, only all factors in conjunction 
determine the activation score, and therefore the strength of correlation of 
individual factors may be misleading, and the contribution of individual factors 
is not so easy to identify. We would like to construct an “optimal” list of 
factors, i.e. a model that provides maximal descriptive power (all relevant 
factors identified and included) and at the same time has a minimal 
descriptional size (just the relevant factors contained and no others). 
  
Second, numeric weights of individual factors’ values were chosen by hand 
which not only was a laborious task, but also did not allow judging the quality 
or uniqueness of the set of calculated weights. 
Third, the interaction between factors was mainly additive, ignoring 
possible non-linear interdependencies between the factors. Non-linear 
dependencies are particularly probable, given that some factors interact with 
others (cf. the discussion of the factor of syntactic role of the linear antecedent 
in section 2.4 above, whose contribution to AS depends on the linear 
distance).12 Other factors might be correlated, e.g. animacy and the syntactic 
role of subject (the distribution of animacy and subjecthood of the antecedent 
vis-à-vis full NPs vs. pronouns is very similar, indicating a possible intrinsic 
interrelationship between these)13. Also, from the cognitive point of view it is 
unlikely that such a simple procedure as addition can adequately describe 
processing of activation in the brain: the basic building blocks of the brain, the 
nerve cells or neurons, exhibit non-linear behaviour, for example due to 
saturation effects. It is well known that purely linear learning schemes cannot 
even solve the simple exclusive-or problem, see e.g. Ellis and Humphreys 
(1999), Ch. 2.4. For an in-depth discussion of the usefulness of non-linearity in 
cognitive and developmental psychology we refer to Elman et. al. (1996). 
Fourth, because of the additive character of factor interaction it was very 
hard to limit possible activation to a certain range. It would be intuitively 
natural to posit that minimal activation varies between zero and some 
maximum, which can, without loss of generality, be assumed to be one. 
However, because of penalizing factors such as paragraph distance that deduct 
activation it often happens that activation score turns out negative (a 
consequence of the simple summing in the calculative approach), which makes 
cognitive interpretation difficult. 
In order to solve these problems, the idea to develop a more sophisticated 
mathematical apparatus emerged, such that: 
• identification of significant factors, numeric weights, and factor 
interaction would all be interconnected and would be a part of the same task 
                                                 
12 And indeed the attribution of different weights to the syntactic role of the linear antecedent 
depending on the linear distance in the calculative approach can already be viewed as an 
element of non-linear interdependencies.  
13 As a mathematical consequence, the weights attributed to animacy and antecedent 
subjecthood are not “stable”: The model would perform almost as well if the numeric weights 
for these two factors were interchanged or even modified so that their sum remained the same. 
Thus the concrete single weights of correlated factors have no objective importance on their 
own, and it is important to single out correlated factors and describe their relationship in order 
to ascribe an objective meaning to a combination (most simply, the sum) of their weights. 
  
• the modeling of factors would be done computationally, by building an 
optimal model of factors and their interaction. 
 
There are many well-known approaches that lend themselves naturally to 
the problems mentioned above (e.g. variants of decisions tree algorithms, 
multiple non-linear regression). Since we have in mind to develop a 
quantitative cognitive model of referential choice as a long-term goal, artificial 
neural network models had a strong appeal to us due to their inherent cognitive 
interpretation (Ellis and Humphreys 1999), even though we cannot expect a 
concrete cognitive model or interpretation to derive from this pilot study based 
on just a small data set.14 We note that the – at first sight – less transparent 
representation of knowledge in a neural network, as compared to classical 
statistical methods, is cured by the fact that the type of regularities it can detect 
in the data is less constrained.  
 We would like to emphasize that the primary aim of this pilot study on a 
quite small data set is to evaluate whether neural networks are applicable to the 
problem of referential choice, and if so, to lay the ground for a larger-scale 
study. In order to keep the present study comparable to the calculative 
approach, we had to use the original data set and neglected from the outset 
factors that already had been judged secondary. 
We dispense with a more sophisticated statistical analysis of the following 
computer simulations since – from the point of view of rigorous statistics – the 
data set is too small to lead to reliable results. Our intention is to get a first taste 
of where neural networks might take us in the analysis of referential choice.  
 
3.2.  Proposed solution: a neural network approach 
In the neural network approach, we lift the requirement of complete 
predictiveness: we posit that referential choice can predict/explain referential 
choice with a degree of certainty that can be less than 100%.15 Also, at this 
time the neural network approach does not make specific claims about 
cognitive adequacy and activation and there is no such thing as summary 
activation score in this approach at its present stage. Activation factors 
themselves are reinterpreted as mere parameters or variables in the data that are 
mapped onto referential choice. We expect that at a later stage – i.e. trained on 
bigger data sets – the neural network approach can embrace the quantitative 
cognitive component. 
                                                 
14 With respect to the small data set we would not be better off with any other of the above 
mentioned methods as all of them are quite data-intensive. 
15 This might be a desirable feature, e.g. to account for alternating referential options. 
  
The term artificial neural network or net denotes a variety of different 
function approximators that are neuro-biologically inspired (Mitchell, 1997). 
Their common property is that they can, in a supervised or unsupervised way, 
learn to classify data. For this pilot study we decided to employ a simple feed-
forward network with the back-propagation learning algorithm.   
A feed-forward network consists of nodes that are connected by weights. 
Every node integrates the activation it gets from its predecessor nodes in a non-
linear way and sends it to its successors. The nodes are ordered in layers. 
Numeric data is presented to the nodes in the input layer, from where the 
activation is injected into one or more hidden layers, where the actual 
computation is done. From there activation spreads to the output layer, where 
the result of the computation is read off. This computed output can be 
compared to the expected target output, and subsequently the weights are 
adapted so as to minimize the difference between actual output and target (a 
so-called gradient descent algorithm, of which the backpropagation algorithm 
is an example, for details we refer to Ellis and Humphreys 1999). 
In this supervised learning task the network must learn to predict from ten 
factors (Table 7), whether the given referent will be realized as a pronoun or a 
full noun phrase. In order to input the factors with symbolic values into the net, 
they have to be converted into numeric values. If the symbolic values denote 
some gradual property such as animacy, they are converted into one real 
variable with values between –1 and 1. The same holds true for binary 
variables. When there was no a priori obvious order in the symbolic values16, 
they were coded unary (e.g. Syntactic Role), i.e. to every value of that factor 
corresponds one input node, which is set to one if the factor assumes this value 
and to zero otherwise.  
 
                                                 
16 For example, the factor of syntactic role can take the values “subject”, “direct object”, 
“indirect object”, “possesive”, etc.  One might speculate that a hierarchy of these values, similar 
to the hierarchy of NP accessibility (Keenan and Comrie 1977), might operate in referential 
choice. But since this is not self-evident, we code such factors unarily so that the network can 
find its own order of the values as relevant for the task at hand. 
  
Factor Values Coding Input 
Nodes 
Syntactic role S, DO, IOag, Obl, 
Poss 
Unary 1–5 
Animacy Human, animal, 
inanimate 
Human: 1, 
animal: 0, 
inanimate: –1 
6 
Protagonisthood Yes / no  Binary 7 
Syntactic role of rhetorical 
antecedent* 
S, DO, IOag, Obl, 
Poss, Pred 
Unary 8–13 
Type of rhetorical antecedent Pro, FNP Binary 14 
Syntactic role of linear antecedent S, Poss, Obl, Pred, 
DO, IOag 
Unary 15–20 
Type of linear antecedent Pro, FNP Binary 21 
Linear distance to antecedent Integer Integer 22 
Rhetorical distance to antecedent Integer Integer 23 
Paragraph distance to antecedent Integer Integer 24 
 
S, DO, IOag, Obl, Poss mean subject, direct object, agentive indirect object, oblique, and 
possessor. Pred means predicative use, Pro pronoun and FNP full noun phrase. 
 
Table 7. Factors used in Simulation 1, their possible values 
 and the corresponding input nodes.  
 
Thus 24 input nodes and one output node are needed. The output node is 
trained to predict whether the referent in question is realized as a full noun 
phrase (numeric output below 0.4) or as a pronoun (numeric output above 
0.6).17 All – at this point – numeric input values were normalized to have zero 
mean and unit variance. This normalization ensures that all data are a priori 
treated on equal footing and the impact of a factor can be directly read off from 
the strength of the weights connecting its input node to the hidden or output 
layer. 
 
3.3. Simulation 1 – full data set 
A network with 24 nodes in a single hidden layer was trained on the data set 
of 102 items18 from Kibrik (1999) (see section 2.4) for 1000 epochs.19 As parts 
                                                 
17 An output value between 0.4 and 0.6 is considered unclassified. However, this did not 
happen in the simulations presented here. Of course, the target values are 0 and 1 for pronouns 
and full NPs, respectively. Yet, for technical reasons it is preferable to admit a small deviation 
of the output value from the target values. 
18 As opposed to the study in section 2.4, here the syntactic pronouns were included. Note that 
due to short linear distance all of them are easily predicted correctly. 
  
of the training are stochastic that experiment was repeated several times. In all 
runs the net learned to predict the data correctly except for a small number 
(below six) cases. Typically, the misclassifications occurred for the same items 
in the data set, independently of the run. A closer analysis of a well-trained net 
with only four misclassifications revealed that three of them were due to 
referential conflict (which was not among the input factors), that is, in the 
situation when the full noun phrase is used only because a pronoun (otherwise 
expected) may turn out ambiguous. 
3.4. Simulation 2 – pruning 
Not only did we want our net to learn the data but also to make some 
statements about the importance of the input factors and their interdependency. 
To achieve this goal we subjected the trained net from Simulation 1 to a 
pruning procedure, which eliminates nodes and weights from the net that 
contribute to the computation of the result only little or not at all. In such case, 
a node or weight is selected and eliminated. Then the net is retrained for 100 
epochs. If net performance does not drop, the elimination is confirmed; 
otherwise the deleted node or weight is restored. This procedure is repeated 
until no further reduction in the size of the net is possible without worsening 
the performance. 20
This procedure leads to smaller nets that are easier to analyze and 
furthermore can reduce the dimensionality of the input data. They have a lower 
number of weights (i.e. a lower number of free parameters: in the case 
analyzed here the number of weights was reduced from 649 for the full net to 
26 for the pruned net). The weights of a generic example of a pruned network 
trained on our data are shown in Table 8. There are no weights connecting the 
input nodes 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, 18, 19, 20, 23 (see Table 8; the meanings of the 
nodes can be found in Table 7). This means that not all input factors or all their 
values are relevant for computing the output. Also, all but two hidden nodes 
have been pruned. So the two remaining suffice to model the interaction 
between the input factors. 
Some input nodes have a direct influence on the output node (27), e.g. the 
node indicating that the rhetorical antecedent was a possessor (node 9). Others 
influence the outcome only indirectly by interacting with other nodes, e.g. 
paragraph distance (node 24), while yet others influence the output both 
directly and indirectly. Some nodes enter in multiple ways that seem to cancel 
each other, e.g. node 14 (type of rhetorical antecedent). 
                                                                                                                            
19 Technical details for NN experts: learning parameter is set to 0.2; no momentum; weights 
were jogged every epoch by maximally 0.1%; input patterns are shuffled. The simulations are 
run on the SNNS network simulator (http://www-ra.informatik.uni-tuebingen.de/SNNS). 
20 More precisely, first we apply the non-contributing units algorithm (Dow and Sietsma, 
1991), and then pruning of the minimal weight.  
  
Target 
node 
Source Nodes (Weights) 
25 1 (-2.4) 2  (2.1) 8 (-1.7) 12 (1.9) 14 (-1.6) 16 (-2.4)  22 (-4.7) 24 (-4.9) 
26 7 (1.7) 10 (-2.0) 12 (-5.0) 14(-1.9) 15 (2.8) 16 (-1.8) 21 (-4.2)  
27 2 (-3.7) 8 (3.9) 9 (2.0) 15 (2.7) 17 (1.8) 22 (-22.0) 25 (10.9) 26 (-10.0) 
 
Nodes 1—24 denote the input nodes, 25 and 26 are the two remaining hidden nodes and 27 is the 
output node. The weights connecting a source and a target node are given in parentheses after the 
source node. 
 
Table 8. Weights of a typical pruned net.  
 
Pruning again is partly a stochastic procedure, as it for example depends 
ultimately on the random initialization of the network, so we repeated the 
experiment until we got an impression of which factors are almost invariably 
included. It turned out that subject and possessor roles21, protagonisthood, 
subjecthood of the antecedent and type of antecedent are most important, and 
those nodes related to the rhetorical antecedent are more involved than those 
for the linear one. As well, the most important distance is rhetorical distance. 
Evidently, this list of factors and values coincides to a great extent with what 
was discovered through the trial-and-error procedure in the calculative 
approach.  Thus, at least qualitatively the neural network approach is on the 
right track, and we can use the results of the pruning case study as a hint on 
how to reduce the dimensionality of the input data. This leads us to the next 
simulation. 
 
3.5. Simulation 3 – reduced data set 
In a third case study we trained a similar net with 12 hidden nodes on a 
reduced set of only five input factors (corresponding to six input nodes): We 
included the values “subject” and “possessor” for syntactic role (nodes 1, 2), 
protagonisthood (node 3), whether the rhetorical antecedent was a subject 
(node 4), whether it was realized as a pronoun or full NP (node 5), and 
rhetorical distance (node 6). The new net had 12 hidden nodes, corresponding 
to 103 weights. On this reduced net, we executed the back-propagation 
learning algorithm for 500 epochs and then pruning (50 epochs retraining for 
each pruning step) with the same parameters as before. We ended up with a 
                                                 
21 Interestingly, some hints on the difference in the usage of argumental and possessive 
pronouns were observed already during the original work on the calculative approach. The fact 
that the networks themselves frequently keep the input for the possessive role can be viewed as 
a corroboration of this thought, and also as a proof that neural networks can be used as an 
independent tool for discovering regularities in the data. Work focusing on this differentiation 
is underway.  
  
small net (23 parameters), shown in Figure 5, that classified only 8 out of 102 
items wrongly.  Note that all remaining factors interact strongly, except for 
protagonisthood (node 3), which has been pruned away. 
 
The circles denote the nodes, the arrows the weights connecting the nodes, to which the weight 
strength is added as a real number. Nodes 1–6 are input nodes, 7–10 the nodes in the hidden layer, 
and node 11 is the output. 
 
Figure 5. Net from Simulation 3.  
 
3.6.  Simulation 4 – cheap data set 
Reliable automatic annotators for rhetorical distance and consequently for 
all factors related to the rhetorical antecedent, as well as for protagonisthood, 
are not available. Since these factors require comprehension of the contents of 
the text, they must be annotated by human experts and are therefore costly. So 
we decided to replace the rhetorical factors included in Simulation 3 by the 
corresponding linear ones and protagonisthood by animacy. Keeping the six 
input nodes as before, we added a seventh one to indicate that the linear 
antecedent was a possessor and an eighth one for paragraph distance to help the 
net to overcome the smaller amount of information that is contained in the 
linear antecedent factors. Training and pruning proceeded as before. 
  
One typical resulting network in this case had 32 degrees of freedom. Again 
animacy, which had been substituted for protagonisthood, is disconnected from 
the rest of the net. On the 102 data items the net produced only six errors (three 
are due to referential conflict). 
Thus, even though the logical structure of the factors and their values was 
considerably simplified, and none of the factors included that relate to the 
rhetorical antecedent, the accuracy (six errors versus four with the full set of 
factors) did not deteriorate dramatically. 
 
3.7. Comparison to the calculative approach 
In the calculative model discussed in section 2.4 above, referential choice 
was modeled by 11 factors using 32 free parameters (counting the number of 
the different numeric weights for all factors and their values). The activation 
score allowed a prediction of the referential choice in five categories. In our 
study with neural networks, we modeled only a binary decision (full 
NP/pronoun) and lifted the requirement of cognitive adequacy. The smallest 
net in the study, in simulation 3, had only 23 free parameters (weights), 5 input 
factors, and the best net on the full set of input factors, in Simulations 1 and 2, 
misclassified only four items, having 26 free parameters. 
Even though the accuracy dropped in the neural network approach (using a 
reduced set of input factors) as compared to the calculative approach (with the 
full set of input factors), the descriptional length (measured in the number of 
free model parameters) was reduced by approximately one third and thus 
yields in this sense a more compact description of the data.  
These findings are important in the following respects. Firstly, we can find a 
smaller set of factors that still allows a relatively good prediction of referential 
choice, but is much less laborious to extract from a given corpus, thus making 
the intended large-scale study feasible. Secondly, we can reduce the 
descriptional length without too severe a drop in accuracy. This means that the 
networks were able to extract the essential aspects of referential choice as 
about 100 instances can be described by only 23 parameters. Compare this to 
the worst case in which a learning algorithm needs about 100 free parameters 
to describe 100 instances. In such case the algorithm would not have learnt 
anything essential about referential choice, because it would be merely the list 
of the 100 instances. The ratio of the number of parameters to the size of data 
set has a long tradition of being used for judging a model’s quality. A high 
  
value of this ratio is an indicator for overfitting22  (see any standard textbook on 
statistics). 
In large-scale studies, which are to follow this pilot study, we expect to 
construct models with an even better ratio of descriptional length to the size of 
data set. 
 
3.8. Comparison to Strube and Wolters (2000) 
As has been pointed out above, there are relatively few studies of referential 
choice – most authors are interested in resolution of anaphoric devices. 
Furthermore, there are almost no studies that would attempt to integrate 
multiple factors affecting reference. However, we are familiar with one study 
that is remarkably close in its spirit to ours, namely Strube and Wolters (2000). 
Strube and Wolters use a similar list of factors as the calculative approach 
discussed above, except that the costly factors related to the rhetorical 
antecedent are missing. They analyze a large corpus with several thousand of 
referring expressions for the categorical decision (full NP/pronoun) using 
logistic regression. The logistic regression is a form of linear regression 
adapted for a binary decision.  
Factor interaction and non-linear relations are thus not accounted for in their 
model, and they present no cognitive interpretation of their model either. Still 
the gist and intention of their and our studies – developed independently – 
largely agree, which provides evidence for the usefulness and appropriateness 
of quantitative approaches towards referential choice. 
 
4. Conclusion and outlook 
In section 3 we reported a pilot study testing whether artificial neural 
networks are suitable to process our data. We trained feed-forward networks on 
a small set of data. The results show that the nets are able to classify the data 
almost correctly with respect to the choice of referential device. A pruning 
procedure enabled us to single out five factors that still allowed for a relatively 
good prediction of referential choice. Furthermore, we demonstrated that costly 
input factors such as rhetorical distance to the antecedent could be replaced by 
those related to the linear antecedent, which can be more easily collected from 
a large corpus.  
                                                 
22 Overfitting means sticking too closely to the peculiarities of a given 
training set and not finding the underlying general regularities. Overfitting 
is roughly the opposite of good generalization of unknown data. 
  
Because of the small amount of data for this pilot study, the result must be 
taken with due care. But these results encourage us to further develop this 
approach.  
Future work will include a study of a larger data set. This is necessary since 
neural networks as well as classical statistics need a large amount of data to 
produce reliable results that are free of artefacts. In our corpus, some situations 
(i.e. an antecedent that is an indirect object) appear only once, so that no 
generalization can be made. In a larger study the advantages of the neural 
network approach can be used fully. 
We also aim at reintroducing a cognitive interpretation at a later stage, and 
want to work with different network methods, that not only allow dimensional 
reduction and data learning, but also an easy way to explicitly extract the 
knowledge from the net in terms of more transparent symbolic rules (see e.g. 
Kolen and Kremer (eds.), 2001). 
Furthermore, we feel the need not only to model a binary decision (full 
NP/pronoun), but also to have a more fine-grained analysis. The calculative 
approach of section 2.4 has done the first steps in this direction, allowing for 
five different categories that not only state that a pronoun or a full NP is 
expected, but also to what degree a full NP in a particular situation can be 
replaced by a pronoun and vice versa.  
A statistical interpretation of referential choice can be suggested: if a human 
expert judges that a particular full NP could be replaced by a pronoun, s/he 
must have experienced that in a very similar situation where the writer did 
indeed realize the other alternative. The expert will be more certain that 
substitution is suitable if s/he has often experienced the alternative situation. 
Thus we think it is promising to replace the five categories discussed in section 
2.4 by a continuous result variable that ranges from zero to one and is 
interpreted as the probability that referential choice realizes a pronoun in the 
actual situation: 1 means a pronoun with certainty, 0 means a full NP with 
certainty, and 0.7 means that in 70% instances a pronoun is realized and a full 
NP in the remaining 30% instances. 
As an anonymous reviewer pointed out to us, there is an interesting 
potential application of neural network-based models of referential choice to 
anaphor resolution. Consider a knowledge-poor anaphor resolution algorithm 
as a quick-and-dirty first pass that suggests several potential referents for a 
pronominal mention. Counterchecking the referent mentions in a second pass, 
a suggested referent could be ruled out if the network does not predict a 
pronominal mention for it at the point in question.  The advantage over 
anaphor resolution algorithms based purely on classical methods would be that 
  
computations in a neural network are really fast compared to algorithmic and 
symbolic computing once the training of the network is finished. 
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Appendix: An Excerpt from an English Narrative 
(“The Maggie B.” by Irene Haas) 
 
1401 Margaret and James were cold. 
1402 The sky grew darker. 
1403 The goat and chickens fled into their 
little shelter, 
1404 the toucan flew screeching into the 
cabin. 
 
1501 James started to cry. 
1502 A storm was coming! 
1503 Margaret must make the boat ready 
at once. 
 
1601 She took in the sail 
1602 and tied it tight. 
1603 She dropped the anchor 
1604 and stowed all the gear, 
1605 while rain drummed on the deck 
1606 and thunder rumbled above her. 
1607 Lightning split the sky  
1608 as she ran into the cabin 
1609 and slammed the door against the wet 
wind. 
1610 Now everything was safe and secure. 
 
1701 When she lit the lamps, 
1702 the cabin was bright and warm. 
1703 It was nearly suppertime 
1704 so Margaret mixed up a batch of 
muffins 
1705 and slid them into the oven. 
1706 She sliced some peaches 
1707 and put cinnamon and honey on top, 
1708 and they went into the oven, too. 
 
1801 James was given a splashy bath in 
the sink. 
1802 Margaret dried him in a big, warm 
towel, 
1803 and then supper was ready. 
 
1901 Outside, the wind howled like a pack 
of hungry wolves. 
1902 Rain lashed the windowpanes. 
1903 But the sturdy little Maggie B. kept 
her balance 
1904 and only rocked the nicest little bit. 
 
2001 Margaret and James ate the beautiful 
sea stew 
2002 and dunked their muffins in the 
broth, 
2003 which tasted of all the good things 
that had cooked in it. 
2004 For dessert they had the peaches with 
cinnamon and honey, and glasses of 
warm goat’s milk. 
 
2101 When supper was over, 
2102 Margaret played old tunes on her 
fiddle. 
2103 Then she rocked James in his cradle 
2104 and sang him his favorite song.
 
  
